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Sanctioning Value: The Legal System, ‘Hyper-power’ and the Legitimation of MP3 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we provide an historical account of the contestation surrounding MP3 and its 
legitimation as a consumer choice option. We undertake a genealogy to expose the 
‘conditions of possibility’ and ‘conditions of acceptability’ for the legitimation of exchange-
based consumption for digital music. 
 
In doing so, we enter the domain of ontological politics to show how the legal system enables 
value production in shaping exchange relations and consumer practices. To explicate these 
processes, we depart from the extant literature by focusing on the activities of courts of law. 
This enables us to show that legitimation relies on the silencing of oppositional discourse 
before it enters the market. 
 
This is a function of the ‘hyper-power’ practiced by the legal community and related actors, 
which, as we show, help constitute or deny value product offerings and the consumer 
practices through which such value is co-created.  
. 
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Introduction   
The promotion of digital music has been hugely successful. It contributes very large sums to 
corporate coffers. There are now over 450 online music stores with 41 million paying 
subscribers to streaming services worldwide (IFPI, 2015), whereas in the early 1990s, there 
were none. MP3 and its derivatives have proliferated, yet are only deemed legitimate 
consumer choice options if accessed via licensed services.  
 
Consumer choice options are categories of goods or services that are classified and prioritised 
as preferred means of satisfying needs. These are typically privately owned and accessed 
through market exchange (Fırat, 1987; Fırat and Dholakia, 1977, 1982). Attached to these 
options are associated practices – ways of understanding, saying and doing (Schau et al., 
2009) – that are legitimate when they conform to the rules and regulations set by the 
legislative apparatus, are consistent with dominant norms and values, and aligned to existing 
cognitive schemas (Humphreys, 2010b). In the case of MP3, these arrangements include 
having to pay and adhere to the conditions set by music retailers. These may entail the 
inability to copy, sell or re-gift them, with file sharing outside of legitimate distribution 
networks labeled as ‘a form of theft’ (see Denegri-Knott, 2004). These processes and 
discursive moves were not inevitable. And they can be challenged via historical excavation.  
 
Until recently, attention to these kinds of processes has been minimal. This is a reflection of 
longstanding paradigmatic and epistemological commitments. For many years, marketing 
theory has grappled with the concept of the marketing system by taking a functionalist 
approach to make sense of how the various constitutive elements of these networks ensure 
the achievement of system objectives (e.g. Layton, 2007, 2009). One of the problems with 
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functionalism as a sociological approach is its orientation towards system maintenance, its 
lack of concerted attention to conflict and the implicit assumption that currently operating 
market and marketing systems should be stabilised and extended in the interest of the public 
good (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). These assumptions inflect recent debates on Service-
Dominant Logic (S-D). 
 
Work carried out under the rubric of S-D Logic has adopted a process-based, evolutionary 
orientation to frame its approach to value co-creation. Within this literature, the consumer is a 
co-creator of value working in conjunction with multiple actors (Chandler and Vargo, 2011; 
Edvardsson et al., 2011; Vargo and Lusch, 2004, 2008, 2015). While these groups often have 
markedly differential access to resources, knowledge and gatekeepers (Arnould, 2007; 
Brown, 2007), questions of power and politics in market organisation are typically 
downplayed. Instead, the world of exchange within S-D Logic is egalitarian, inclusive, 
‘balanced’ (Karababa and Kjeldgaard, 2013) and ‘symmetric’ (Akaka et al., 2013, Chandler 
and Vargo, 2011; Lusch and Vargo, 2008; Vargo and Lusch, 2015) with mutual benefit the 
order of the day (Akaka and Vargo, 2015; Gummesson, 2008).     
 
This view of co-creation as a harmonious process leading to positive outcomes for all does 
not sit comfortably with research that highlights the politics, conflictual relations and 
exploitation that permeate the market (e.g. Corvellec and Hultman, 2014; Cova and Dalli, 
2009; Edvardsson et al., 2014; Laamanen and Skålén, 2015). While such works are rare, they 
do invite us to think more critically about the political constitution of value co-creation and 
the uneven distribution of power between state, companies and consumer. Nonetheless, even 
these studies tacitly assume that power is a possession of a dominant firm which seeks to 
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maintain key ideas and values that functionally animate the marketing context and its 
attendant co-creative practices (Edvardsson et al., 2011; Schau et al., 2009). 
 
The problem here is that firm and consumer agency is enacted within boundaries set by field-
defining ‘superordinate institutions’ (Humphreys, 2010a) and ‘supraorganizational’ 
influences (Edvardsson et al., 2014). This lacuna has recently been appreciated by S-D 
proponents in their reflections on service ecosystems (Akaka and Vargo, 2015; Vargo and 
Lusch, 2015) and ‘institutional logics’ (Edvardsson et al., 2014). They argue that we need to 
produce more realistic representations of the processes of value constitution that account for 
the multiple actors above and beyond the firm-consumer dyad. In particular, their attention 
has gravitated to the institutional level (Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Prior, forthcoming; Vargo 
and Lusch, 2015). They encourage us to explore how norms, rules and frameworks enable 
value production and marketplace activities. Attention to the socio-historic shaping of 
exchange relations, it is maintained, is an essential future direction for research (Akaka and 
Vargo, 2015; Vargo and Akaka, 2012).  
 
At present, their focus has been conceptual (e.g. Akaka and Vargo, 2015; Chandler and Vargo, 
2011; Vargo and Lusch, 2015). To further the type of critical enquiry we have in mind and 
situate exchange processes within the power relations that do permeate the marketplace 
(Kotler, 1972, 1986), we must explore the roles played by institutional actors in defining the 
conditions of possibility for value creation and exchange. Studying the institutional matrix 
that frames the marketplace is one of the ‘keys to understanding human systems and social 
activity’ (Vargo and Lusch, 2015: 18). Put otherwise, the marketing system we inhabit is the 
product of human agents and organisations that are embedded in the institutional frameworks 
that support capitalistic market structures (Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Giesler, 2008; Giesler 
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and Veresiu, 2014). One of the most prominent is the legal system whose legitimation 
function undergirds and reciprocally interacts with the market (Foucault, 2008), helping 
constitute marketing practice and enable consumer access to goods and services (Brei and 
Tadajewski, 2015; Giesler, 2008).  
 
Vargo and Akaka (2012), Vargo and Lusch (2015) and Prior (forthcoming) do register that the 
legal system, legislatures and legislation are some of the most important conditions of 
possibility for the historical and on-going operation of the market. But their argument is 
underdeveloped. Vargo and Akaka (2015), for example, repeat the mantra of S-D Logic that 
value is phenomenologically determined by the consumer. However, there is an oscillation in 
this body of work. Vargo and colleagues seem to partly appreciate – at some level – the 
differential basis of power relations in society. It is not the individual or ultimate consumer 
who is solely responsible for value judgements. More accurately, they make value 
determinations on the basis of a range of options that have already been winnowed for their 
attention by institutions and social structures. Vargo et al implicitly register this when they 
stress that institutions are the ‘guiding forces of value determination’ (Vargo et al., 2015:68) 
 
Joining these narrative threads – that is, the importance ascribed to the legal community and 
differential power relations – leads us to theorise that this community of practice is one of 
‘guiding forces’ in value constitution. It structures political-economic (Bakan, 2005; 
Foucault, 2008, 2015), organisational (Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Humphreys, 2010a; Kotler, 
1986; Vargo and Lusch, 2015) and consumer practices (Askegaard and Linnet, 2011; Atik and 
Fırat, 2013; Brei and Tadajewski, 2015; Giesler, 2008; Giesler and Veresiu, 2014). What we 
mean is that the legal system and the decisions made within law courts enable and constrain 
what are legitimate consumption options and consumer practices and thus objects for our 
  
6 
attention and engagement. This bedrock assumption clearly differentiates our work from 
traditions like S-D Logic which focus on the idea that value is only constituted within the 
market (Akaka and Vargo, 2015; Grönroos, 2012; Gummesson, 2008). We suggest that 
decisions about value are legitimated or de-legitimated before a consumer uses a product or 
service.   
 
In other words, the legal system helps constitute or deny value to product offerings (Pietz, 
1985). Our choices and agency are structured, patterned and delimited by actors who deny 
alternative regimes of marketplace (and non-marketplace) practice while affirming others. 
These decisions are often more consistent with the needs of the capitalist system, 
organisational profit objectives and the continued expansion of the status quo (Applbaum, 
2009; Banerjee et al., 2011). Reflecting these ideas, in this paper we engage with issues of 
ontological politics and the legitimation of choice options and practices by imbricating the 
marketplace within the legal system. The latter helps frame industries in certain ways, 
thereby performing a major role in reaffirming the ‘hyper-power’ of capitalist exchange 
relations that impact upon the consumer (Foucault, 2015). We explore this topic via a 
genealogy of the development and politics manifested in the legal sphere relating to MP3 and 
digital music.  
 
Focusing on the legal system (and attendant writings, opinions and scholarship intended to 
direct it) demarcates this study from prior research. Previous scholarship has touched upon the 
importance of the legal and regulatory environment, but only in passing. Humphreys (2010a, 
2010b) charts shifts in the legal environment enabling the growth of the casino industry. 
Giesler (2008) makes succinct gestures to the relevance of studying the legal system and its 
influence on consumption choices, signalling the importance of these factors in relation to 
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music downloading. Offering a slightly different perspective, Denegri-Knott and Tadajewski 
(2010) provide a valuable – albeit incomplete – genealogical account of the influence of 
macro- and meso-level factors that defined the technological basis for MP3. They focused on 
government policy, important stakeholders (e.g. the recording industry, AT&T and the 
Fraunhofer Institute), their corporate cultures and the contributions of disciplinary specialisms 
(e.g. psychoacoustics and electrical engineering) to illuminate the contextual dynamics for the 
production of this technological artefact.  
 
Our reference to the incomplete nature of their genealogy should not be taken as a wholesale 
criticism. By their nature, genealogies are partial. Foucault registered that additional studies 
are always necessary to flesh out the ‘polyhedron of intelligibility’ that enables us to make 
sense of the formation, sedimentation and extension of a discipline (e.g. Tadajewski, 2006, 
2010b, 2011, 2012), mode of thought (e.g. Zwick and Bradshaw, forthcoming), conceptual 
category (e.g. Tadajewski, forthcoming) or object of analysis (e.g. Foucault, 2000). This is the 
generative motive for the present paper. We extend the analysis of Denegri-Knott and 
Tadajewski (2010) by articulating how MP3 was ‘ordered’ as a consumer choice option 
affixed to ‘Market Conservatism’. We expose the power relations permeating the decisions 
that de-legitimated alternative exchange regimes – a highly novel contribution to the 
academic literature (Humphreys, 2010a) – and legitimated conservative consumption 
practices. The latter was only enabled through the silencing of oppositional discourse. We 
explore how a major facet of this ‘marketplace drama’ (Giesler, 2008) was affirmed by the 
legal system, that is, how the social field for music consumption was enrolled within the orbit 
of possessive individualism, Market Conservatism and the circuits of capital.  
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The idea of historical research as a tool for ‘ontological denaturalisation’ (Fournier and Grey, 
2000), that is, with rethinking why certain exchange relationships and consumption practices 
are legitimate while others are denied sanction is based upon the theoretical, conceptual, 
epistemological and methodological resources bequeathed by Michel Foucault. Foucault’s 
ideas have been used to draw our attention to the role of power in producing and denying 
certain ways of thinking about markets, marketing, marketing theory and consumer agency 
(e.g. Ahmadi, forthcoming; Earley, 2015; Falconer Al-Hindi and Staddon, 1997; Giesler and 
Veresiu, 2014; Skalen et al., 2006; Tadajewski, 2006, 2011). These accounts often articulate 
how the way we think, act and engage with the world is permeated with power relations that 
operate at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels (Giesler, 2008; Tadajewski et al., 2014; Zwick 
and Bradshaw, forthcoming), subtly channeling institutional activities and consumer action in 
certain directions and not others at the same time as they leave room for resistance (Ahmadi, 
forthcoming). We will engage with key ideas, concepts and methodological ‘precautions’ 
offered by Foucault below, focusing specifically on the concept of ‘hyper-power’ (Foucault, 
2015). Our empirical focus, combined with the analytic sensitivity offered by Foucault’s 
recent work, thereby deepens contemporary debates regarding value creation, affirmation and 
de-legitimation in multiple ways.      
 
The structure of the manuscript is as follows. First, we explain our historical and theoretical 
approach. We then identify how MP3 as a consumer choice option emerged. This is achieved 
by focusing on historical contingency, discursive formation and institutional sedimentation. 
For analytic purchase – an essential feature given the tendency of genealogical studies to run 
to considerable length (e.g. Tadajewski, 2006, forthcoming) – we have focused our analysis 
on the 1999-2001 A&M Records v. Napster Inc. case. This was an important case that has not 
been studied in the level of detail we undertake in this paper. It merits attention as it was 
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foundational in the process of the legitimation of MP3 (Denegri-Knott, 2004; Giesler, 2008). 
We explicate the dynamics among the various stakeholders and chart the effects of ‘hyper-
power’ in this legal case and market. We conclude with a discussion of our findings and 
indicate directions for future research.     
 
Moving Towards Epistemology and Methodology  
A criticism of marketing theory that still carries weight today is that we know comparatively 
little about the emergence of consumer choice options. We understand a great deal about 
consumer decision-making, but far less about the processes that normalise methods of need 
satisfaction (Brei and Tadajewski, 2015; Fırat, 1987; Humphreys, 2010a). Obviously, our 
ability to make a choice is not simply an individual decision (Alderson, 1958). Choices are 
the outcome of complex socio-historical processes that can be traced at multiple levels (e.g. 
Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Giesler, 2008).  
 
Recently scholars have made a plea for registering that our choices are deeply influenced by 
wider contexts (e.g. Askegaard and Linnet, 2011; Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Vargo et al., 
2015). On rare occasions, reference is made to the preformatting of choice by our respective 
institutions and laws (Fırat, 1987; Humphreys, 2010a). This reorientation of marketing and 
consumer research cuts to the core of contemporary debates. In emphatic terms, Chandler and 
Vargo aver that ‘How exchange is framed by context is a fundamental aspect in the study of 
markets and value co-creation that requires further exploration’ (2011: 45).  
 
Our position departs from the epistemology of S-D Logic and connects with the emerging 
critical literature referenced above. Taking a cue from this material, the marketplace is not a 
domain of equivalent power relations (Arnould, 2014; Banerjee et al., 2011; Foucault, 2015). 
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It is decidedly unequal and asymmetric (Applbaum, 2009; Foucault, 2008; Geiger et al., 
2012; Giesler, 2008; Kotler, 1972, 1986). This is made very apparent in the intellectual 
bedrock for studies on ‘megamarketing’ (e.g. Kotler, 1986). Kotler (1972) has long been 
aware of the unequal nature of the marketplace, references the role for coercion in exchange 
relations, the prominence of ‘vested interests’ and the usefulness of threats to secure desired 
behaviours (e.g. Kotler, 1972, 1986). Connected to this, history is often ‘violent’ and ‘bloody’ 
(Foucault, 1979: 134). And our inherited political, economic and legal systems as well as the 
marketplace reflect these conflictual tropes (e.g. Ahrne et al., 2015; Edvardsson et al., 2014). 
These analytic points have been underplayed to date (Giesler et al., 2012). We emphasise 
them.        
 
In the opinion of Foucault, scholars might look to particular domains if they want to see the 
power-laden tapestry of human and institutional activity most vividly. His general point is 
that we need to look to areas where there are structurally sedimented institutions, forms of 
knowledge, disciplinary specialisms and actors who interact with groups that seek to 
transform the order of discourse (Foucault, 1979, 2015). He usually singles out groups who 
are part of the status quo or operating on its margins. They are typically permitted to 
differentiate between normal and abnormal practice (e.g. Foucault, 1977/1991: 248-249). 
Psychiatrists figure prominently in his ruminations, as do judges. They all promote 
‘normalizing’ discourses (e.g. Foucault, 1977/1991: 296-297; 2006: 102, 133, 202; 2015: 
240-241).  
        
In the case of MP3, Foucault’s arguments direct our attention to the ways in which historical 
developments contribute to our current experiences, engagements and marketplace 
participation (e.g. Foucault, 2008). His archaeological and genealogical studies are useful in 
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that they illuminate how particular theoretical traditions, concepts, practices and institutions 
have emerged. He connects these discussions to external factors that shape a variety of 
domains of discourse, often referencing important political, legal, economic, social processes 
and events that help cement particular realities. This descriptive facet of his work is called his 
archaeological approach. Subject to criticism for failing to illuminate the role of power led 
him to engage with ‘the way in which relations of power give rise to discursive practices’ in 
later work (Foucault, 2015: 93). This was the genealogical element of his analysis, with the 
latter label subsuming archaeology. It is the approach we take in this paper.   
               
These methodological ‘precautions’ led us to explore the interactions between those who seek 
to reaffirm traditional market exchange relations and those seeking to produce, promote and 
extend alternative visions of market and non-market systems using genealogical analysis as 
our methodological strategy. This focus on power relations keys into an important theme 
underwriting Foucault’s approach to historical analysis. He posits that history is a 
battleground: ‘The historic force which propels and determines us is in fact warlike…It 
is…understandable and should be analysed down to the last detail; but analysed in terms of 
the understanding of battles, struggles and tactics’ (Foucault, 1979: 134).  
 
Just because power is not something that is possessed – Foucault asserts that power can only 
be practiced – does not entail that some groups, classes, or institutionally sanctioned 
professionals do not have the potential to exert a greater level of power than others (Foucault, 
2015). This nuance is neglected in research invoking Foucault. Gestures are sometimes made 
to the linkage between power and resistance. What is not appreciated is that certain groups 
can mobilise ‘hyper-power’ (Foucault, 2015). Hyper-power is a ‘multiplied, accumulated 
power’ (Foucault, 2015: 219). It is a vision of power relations that stresses the mobility and 
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plurality of relations of force – thus working against Marxist accounts – yet still registers the 
inequitable distribution of influence. 
         
While it is the case that one group (like the bourgeoisie) cannot inflict its vision on the rest of 
a population without any resistance, social privilege can result in power effects that are 
ramified and cohesive (cf. Geiger et al., 2012; Humphreys, 2010a). Arguably, this is likely to 
be the case when power relations are mobilised by a group with social sanction, legislative 
power and the weight of historical precedent on their side. As Foucault explains:                      
 
‘The power relationship does not conform to the monotonous and definitive schema of 
oppression. Of course, in this kind of general war through which power is exercised, there is 
a social class that occupies a privileged position and may thereby impose its strategy, carry 
off a certain number of victories, accumulate them, and obtain the advantage of an effect of 
hyper-power.’ 
(Foucault, 2015: 228)          
 
Given the prominence of these institutions and actors, there are often records of these 
strategic interventions in the order of discourse that capture the contestation that took place. 
We are not looking for things that are not or never said in relation to an order of discourse. 
This is a methodological idea that is bereft of sense (e.g. Deleuze, 1999: 57; Foucault, 
1976/1998: 11, 2015: 166). Foucault’s point is that we should look at what is said, by whom, 
for what purpose and unravel why it secures discursive and analytic purchase.  
 
Relatedly we must be attentive to the elision of statements, denials of validity, challenges to 
acceptability or appropriateness within an order of discourse (Foucault, 1979, 2015). This 
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provides us with insight into the ‘conditions of acceptability’ (Foucault, 2015). Importantly, 
these movements and power plays are ‘transparent to analysis and…can be discovered if we 
study the strategies of power. Where sociologists see only the silent or unconscious system of 
rules, where epistemologists see only poorly controlled ideological effects, I think it is 
perfectly possible to see perfectly calculated, controlled strategies of power’ (Foucault, 2015: 
236).  
 
Methodologically, therefore, this encourages us to pursue close readings of prominent case 
studies, analytic arguments, legal judgements, as well as explore marginalised literature, 
works and themes that have been written out of the canon. To destabilise our current 
understanding of MP3, we engage with texts written between 1993 and 1999 endorsing free 
digital music. We read this material in conjunction with content derived from software 
engineering and law, where digital music is classified as a common (not private, commercial) 
good amenable to infinite sharing. This archive consists of 15 manuscripts written by law 
theorists and 22 authored by software engineers. 
 
In mapping the transformation and legitimisation of digital music consumption, we unravel 
disputes between three competing discourses (Digital Communitarianism, Digital 
Libertarianism and Market Conservatism) that were mobilised during the 1999-2001 A&M v 
Napster Inc. case. Engaging with these sources will enable us to narrate how a plurality of 
choices are winnowed to a consumer choice option. This focus on a legal case is consistent 
with Foucault’s engagement with court evidence. He used these to illuminate competing 
discourses. Our empirics comprises 90 documents amounting to 1444 pages of text. This 
includes declarations from interested parties, court rulings, summaries, notices, 
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memorandums, expert reports, amici briefs in support of Napster or A&M Records and trial 
transcripts of the proceedings.  
 
The analysis involved weighing the currency of different discourses and the authorities 
representing key institutions (i.e. who was empowered to speak, for what purpose and with 
what result). Specifically we traced attempts to conceptualise and manage emergent objects, 
practices and subjects. These exercises enabled us to see the effects of ‘hyper-power’ and the 
fixing of MP3 as a digital consumer choice option and their corresponding consumption 
practices as legitimate in the eyes of the law.  
 
Where previous scholarship has been attentive to the formation of choice options as an 
evolutionary process (Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Chaney et al., forthcoming) we 
conceptualise them as resulting from the ramifications of ‘hyper-power’ (Foucault, 2015), 
discontinuity and continuity (Foucault, 1979). We widen the scope of actors embroiled in the 
production and affirmation of market systems beyond the consumer-producer dyad to include 
a multiplicity of actors – a methodological move consistent with Foucault’s work and the 
recommendations of recent publications (e.g. Chaney et al., forthcoming; Geiger et al., 2012; 
Giesler, 2008; Humphreys, 2010a).  
 
COMPETING MARKET AND NON-MARKET SYSTEMS FOR DIGITAL MUSIC 
 
MP3 as a Common Good 
The emergence of MP3 sharing in the mid-1990s was disruptive and discontinuous. Nor was 
it consistent with the conditions of acceptability that circulate in capitalist marketplaces. As 
appreciated by Giesler (2008), the hacker positioning of MP3s as common goods challenged 
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the legitimacy of traditional consumption practices for music. Historical contingencies 
exacerbated this movement into a liminal twilight. Most notably these included the lack of 
regulation for Internet start-ups and government initiatives to wire schools and university 
campuses. Equally important was the discursive work being undertaken in the fields of law, 
cyber-culture and software engineering.  
 
The first MP3s were consumer made and the appropriation of compression technology by 
hackers provided one of the conditions of possibility for the cultural practices that boosted 
the spread of MP3, especially among American students. These enjoyed faster networks than 
their European cousins that they employed to share music. Without the exponential growth of 
the Internet and the development of computer processing power to run music files, Internet 
Relay Chat to facilitate sharing, the advent of technology like MP3 players and online skins 
to play MP3 files, MP3 technology would never have been recognised as a thing of value. 
The factors that enabled the diffusion of this technology were, therefore, manifold and 
interlocking.  
 
Even though free sharing of MP3s was prevalent in the 1990s, there were attempts to enrol 
them within commercial market structures by e.Music, MP3.com, Ritmoteca and Sony Music 
among others. However, it was only with the popularisation of Napster beginning in August 
1999 that an attempt to create a competing market system for digital music took hold. 
Napster’s Peer-to-Peer (P2P) file sharing architecture facilitated the transmission of MP3s by 
making the files available to other users. At its height, the service had over 75 million users 
(i.e. July, 2001) sharing approximately 10,000 music files per second (Brief of Plaintiff, 
2000). By this time users, particularly those located in North America, were conversant with 
a sharing logic that permeated most popular Internet applications (Rheingold, 1993). It is 
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within this context that file sharing was articulated as an expression of free sharing among 
Napster’s users.  
 
These articulations have their seeds in essays posted online between 1993 and 1999 by Ram 
Samudrala from the Free Music Movement. His posts present a justification for digital music 
sharing as an alternative non-market system of music production and consumption. 
Samudrala starts by defining his philosophy as ‘an anarchistic grassroots, but high-tech 
system of spreading music: the idea that creating, copying, and distributing music must be as 
unrestricted as breathing air’. He clarifies that ‘you have the freedom to make a copy of a CD 
I’ve created, the freedom to download sound files of songs I’ve created from my server on 
the Internet, the freedom to cover or improve upon a song I’ve written’. 
 
These ideas are refractions of a Digital Communitarian discourse that surfaced in the early 
1990s in the writings of software engineer and free software advocate, Richard Stallman, 
legal analysts like Jochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig and cultural commentators like 
Howard Rheingold. Digital Communitarianism proclaimed the Internet as a new commons, a 
collectively produced and shared space (Rheingold, 1993; Benkler, 1999; Lessig, 1999a, 
1999b). In the commons, it was the community member and not the consumer, who was 
engaged in coproducing a peer-based economy. The field of law reverberated with references 
to the Internet as a commons. Lessig (1999b: 3), for example, maintained that: 
  
‘The Internet is a commons: the space that anyone can enter, and take what she finds 
without the permission of a librarian, or a promise to pay. The net is built on a 
commons – the code of the world wide web, html, is a computer language that lays 
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itself open for anyone to see – to see, and to steal, and to use as one wants…It’s out 
there for the taking; and what you take leaves as much for me as there was before.’ 
 
He uses the terminology of the commons to link an open Internet architecture to a vibrant 
public domain. This allows him to transverse issues of free expression, access to content and 
the preservation of the public domain. With Benkler and Litman, Lessig enunciates a 
normative position to defend an open information structure for digital goods. Their point is 
profoundly antithetical to capitalist conditions of acceptability. Read in conjunction, they 
believe that digital goods should be freely accessed. Hence their invocation of genealogical 
precedent in the form of the ‘commons’ and the threats posed by capitalist enclosure (i.e. the 
potential for the emergence of new forms of ‘illegalism’ tied to behavioural practices 
ultimately deemed deviant in relation to incumbent legal and social mores (Foucault, 2015)). 
 
For Lessig, there should be a strong counterweight to private property (1999a, 1999c, 1999d). 
In sketching out an alternative vision for the ordering of digital goods as common goods, he 
is well aware that the status quo, that is, the legal system and current political-economic 
thinking will work against perspectives inconsistent with the conditions of acceptability for 
statements about property rights. Here, the weight of history can potentially cleave space in 
current formations of discourse in the hope of fomenting alternative perspectives that would 
ordinarily find it difficult to negotiate the assumption bases in play. As Lessig explains,    
  
‘We need a way to resist this. We need a way to show just why this obsession with 
property is not the property our framers had in mind. We need a way to show that it will 
recreate the closed society. We need a way to show that IP [Intellectual Property] has 
always been understood to mean balance between incentives and the commons…We 
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need some way to get people to see that the resistance to this propertization is not 
communism’ (Lessig, 1999c: 14). 
 
These justifications for a non-market system drew from deontological ethics and utilitarian 
ideals. Samudrala invokes this grounding: ‘Limiting your creativity to specific audiences, 
especially…[for] monetary reasons, is shirking existential responsibility and destructive to 
society as a whole’. Such lofty ideals had previously been popularised by Richard Stallman 
(whom Samudrala cites). Stallman was a staunch advocate of the right to access, change and 
freely distribute computer code. His position diverges significantly from extant copyright 
law: ‘the desire to be rewarded for one’s creativity does not justify depriving the world in 
general of all or part of that creativity…the Golden Rule requires that if I like a program I 
must share it with other people who like it’ (Stallman, 1985: 33).  
 
The logic of these observers was beguiling. Morally, everyone should be able to experience 
and contribute to the production of a digital commons. The benefit(s) for the community 
should be elevated above the rights of individuals. An open and transparent system of cultural 
proliferation would enhance engagement with the content and strengthen communal ties 
(Rheingold, 1993; Stallman, 2002). In stronger terms, failing to contribute to the community 
causes ‘psychosocial harm’ (Stallman, 1992). It is ‘antisocial and anti-ethical’ (Stallman, 
2002: 8). These discursive narratives weaved throughout user communities, with the Internet 
savvy justifying their activities by invoking terms such as community, gifts and sharing (e.g. 
Giesler and Pohlmann, 2003a, 2003b; Giesler, 2006, 2008).  
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Digital Libertarianism and MP3 as a Promotional Hook  
File sharing was not simply a function of the ethos articulated and enacted on the web. It was 
enabled by the zeal of high-tech entrepreneurs who circulated the applications needed to 
create and share MP3s. So, we are not within the terrain of ‘illegalism’ yet (i.e. where 
community needs and desires are eclipsed in the face of a corporate pursuit of profit which is 
affirmed through legal sanction). Rather, this is a familiar terrain within the development of 
capitalism. The political-economic-legal structure of capitalism has historically had a fairly 
profound tolerance for activities that enable the expansion of the marketplace (Foucault, 
2015), especially those that help it operate efficiently prior to its sedimentation in ways 
conducive to corporate profit objectives – the objective that drives business in the American 
legal system (e.g. Bakan, 2005).   
 
Online success relied on attracting enough eyeballs to constitute a website as a tradable 
commodity. Venture capitalists were eager to invest in sites with appropriate levels of ‘share 
of mind’ (e.g. New York Times, 2000; Raymond, 1998, 1999; Spector, 2000). This investment 
influx coincided with a period of financial prosperity in the US. Low interest rates eased 
access to capital and fostered a flurry of speculation on start-ups like Napster who had only 
vague ideas about how to monetize their popularity.  
 
The need for rapid growth led to a translation in the concept of ‘free’. As we have shown, for 
Digital Communitarianism ‘free’ meant freedom of expression and equal access to a vibrant 
public sphere and its production. However, in the emerging market system around MP3, 
‘free’ was used as a promotional hook. Napster, in particular, used MP3s as hooks to attract 
consumers who they hoped to convert into paying customers (Dinger, 1998). By converting 
users, Napster wanted to monetize their popularity through the sale of ‘subscriptions, product 
  
20 
sales, sale of demographic information, and ultimately, [the] sale of the company’ (Brief of 
Plaintiffs, 2000: 13). 
 
To legitimize this commercial moment, moral traction was provided by a Digital Libertarian 
discourse that proselytized the rights of the individual citizen to exploit the richness of the 
digital terrain without government intervention. Digital Libertarianism fused technological 
determinism with free market, liberal ideals, celebrating the Internet as a regulation-free 
zone. Market mechanisms were heralded as the vehicle to ensure individual freedom and 
societal wellbeing. These discursive threads are prominent in the writings of John Perry 
Barlow, founder of the Electronic Freedom Foundation (Perry Barlow, 1996) and Eric S. 
Raymond (1998, 1999, 2000) from the Open Source Movement. They were often featured in 
Wired magazine.   
 
Raymond’s essays allow us to trace how classical liberal ideas were used to substantiate 
defining code as private property. He argues that private property is attributable to the 
labourer who works and improves it; accepting this, the same logic should define the 
relationship between the creator of code and her labour (1998, 1999, 2000). Private property 
in this axiology is an incentive to work. As such, Napster’s developers were morally entitled 
to profit from their invention. Moreover, Digital Libertarianism’s objection to government 
intervention was grounded on the belief that the Internet was ‘the freest of spaces’ and 
governed only by ‘enlightened self-interest’ (Barlow, 1994, 1996). Internet start-ups like 
Napster could use digital goods, like MP3s, as promotional hooks to build the critical mass 
needed because ‘unlike physical goods where there was a direct correlation between scarcity 
and value…Most soft goods increase in value as they become more common’ so ‘it may often 
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be the case that the best thing you can do to raise the demand for your product is to give it 
away’ (Barlow, 1996).   
 
Some tentative conclusions can be made regarding free sharing on the web. Initially MP3 was 
not classified as a terminal item of consumption. It was a link in a process of sharing, 
proliferation and promotion. To legitimate appropriate use and symbolic values, actors 
invoked a Digital Communitarian discourse that regarded MP3s as common goods. Digital 
music consumption practices could, therefore, have been defined by the parameters of 
commons-based or collaborative production. These practices could have been defined as 
normal, but they were enfolded in contestation that sought to rethink these emerging 
discourses in ways congruent with capitalist and free market economics. This legally and 
economically framed challenge led to the patterning of MP3 as a legitimate consumer choice 
option, as we shall see.  
 
MP3 as a Legitimate Consumer Choice Option 
Securing consensus on the definition of MP3 consumption practices was not simple. It 
involved the collision of competing discourses. These struggles come to the fore during the 
1999-2001 A&M Records v. Napster Inc. case. In the next section we identify discursive 
transformations through which exchange based MP3 consumption gained legitimation within 
the legal structure. We draw attention to derivations in discourse and positional mutations in 
market actors, objects and practices in the attempts to accommodate crystallising objects and 
behaviours.   
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The Napster Court Case: Discursive Contestations  
On December 6, 1999, an anti-downloading coalition filed suit against Napster on grounds of 
vicarious and contributory infringement and unfair competition in the Northern District of 
California. By May 24, 2000, songwriter and music producers Jerry Leiber, Mike Stoller and 
the Frank Music Corporation joined forces with the first claimants to shut down the service. 
This was challenged by Napster’s defence to the Ninth Court of Appeals, but the judges 
presiding were in agreement that file sharing was illicit under copyright law. Napster was 
forced to remove problematic material and it ceased operations in 2001. In court documents 
summarising the District and Appeals court proceedings, one of the issues to be defined was 
‘the boundary between sharing and theft, personal use and unauthorized worldwide 
distribution of copyrighted music and sound recordings’ (Opinion, 2000: 1). As the files 
submitted were scrutinised and the final deliberations read, what was disputed was Napster’s 
right to provide a service, not the legitimacy of MP3 as a common good or free sharing as a 
consumption practice. Such possibilities were quickly buried.  
 
Any submitted declaration that sought legitimacy based on Digital Communitarian arguments 
was either not invoked or dismissed on technical grounds. Lawrence Lessig’s (2000) defence 
of MP3 as a common good and free sharing as a legitimate practice was dismissed because 
his report ‘merely offers a combination of legal opinion and editorial comment on Internet 
policy’ (Memorandum and Order of Re Admissibility of Expert Reports, 2000: 9). This was a 
first volley in attempts to define normal consumption of MP3 in terms congruent with Market 
Conservatism. It was not the last.  
 
Another legal report produced by a consortium of 18 copyright professors, including Jessica 
Litman (Amicus Curiae of Copyright Professors, 2000), that objected to the criminalisation 
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of legitimate practices like sharing and copying was not referenced in final rulings. Instead, 
discussion centred on five market reports. The latter were meant to support or dispute claims 
that Napster was a deleterious influence on legitimate consumption of paid-for music. Much 
of the ensuing discursive struggles dealt with Napster’s right to profit from its innovative 
software. These juxtaposed Digital Libertarian and Market Conservative discourses. After all, 
Napster and their amici (e.g. America Online, Amazon, Yahoo!, Consumer Electronics and 
the Computer and Communications Industry Association) were only present to defend 
Napster’s P2P architecture. Napster was defined as a neutral technology (albeit defined in 
terms that were remarkably consistent with the conditions of acceptability), with the amici 
calling the curbing of its technology unwarranted and capable of producing a ‘chilling effect 
in the development of the new medium and new technologies’ (Ad Hoc Copyright Coalition, 
2000: 8).  
 
The recording industry and judges alike sought to understand MP3 through the prism of 
established formats, most notably the CD. This tied an emerging process of digital 
proliferation into the circuits of capital and the existing rule structure applicable to copyright 
music (i.e. rendering MP3 in ways consistent with the conditions of acceptability). Here we 
see ‘hyper-power’ in action. Established industry players, supported by the weight of the 
legal community and precedent, examined a discontinuous innovation through capitalist 
convention and enrolled the services of experts to define a new technology in a manner 
consistent with a capitalistic and legal status quo.  
    
To produce a chain of equivalence, the expertise of Dennis Drake, a sound engineer 
specialising in digital recordings, was used. He concluded that: ‘the compared downloads are 
identical in content and nature to the respective sound recordings contained in the 
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commercially released form and are, in fact, duplications of the master recordings’ 
(Declaration Dennis M. Drake, 2000: 4). Once conceptualised through a capitalist 
framework, forms of knowledge operating over copyrighted music were extended to MP3s. 
They were not copies made by agentic consumers creating value that enriched the public 
domain as claimed by Digital Communitarianism, but corporate assets. File sharing was 
thereby illegitimate since users ‘had not been given permission for the file to be distributed 
on the Napster system’ (Declaration Charles J. Hausman, 2000: 2). Nor was this form of 
distribution commensurate with copying music for playback and personal sharing. This 
particular claim to truth trumped efforts to classify MP3s as legitimate promotional hooks. In 
documents submitted by Napster’s defence team, the use of MP3s for marketing purposes is 
presented as reasonable. They positioned MP3 as a poor quality sample. It was not a terminal 
consumption item, like a CD, in this legal parry. The sharing of MP3 was, therefore, akin to 
‘visiting a listening station or borrowing a CD from a friend, to decide whether to purchase’ 
(Opposition, 2000: 13). In addition, their use as samples enhanced the consumption of music 
as a choice option because there is ‘clear evidence that sampling on Napster increases, rather 
than decreases, the market for that work’ (Opposition, 2000: 13). To buttress this position 
Napster’s defence included comments from The Offspring’s manager, and the rapper, Chuck 
D, who claimed that free MP3s allowed them to ‘reach fans directly’ (Declaration Chuck D, 
2000; Declaration The Offspring, 2000). Official documents included references to many 
bands who used Napster to ‘promote themselves’, thereby ‘encouraging distribution of their 
work among a wide audience’ and ‘obtaining unprecedented exposure at a minimal cost’ 
(Opposition, 2000: 11).  
 
In summary, a Market Conservative discourse established MP3 on a plane of equivalence to 
CD recordings that belonged to a copyright owner. Discursive contestation resulted in the 
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classification of MP3 as a consumer choice option and free sharing practices were declared 
illegitimate since they violated a significant condition of acceptability, namely the music 
industry’s pursuit of profit (among other factors). Even so, while a very specific consumption 
practice for MP3s was defined by a Market Conservative discourse, this discourse was not 
immune to internal change. It underwent a series of mutations. These reduced the range of 
normative experiences people could have with MP3 in comparison to other music formats.  
 
Mutations   
Once MP3s were classified as consumer choice options when accessed legitimately via 
market exchange, file sharing became an act of theft. If ‘putting a CD in their pocket and 
walking out without paying’ was an illegal act, then so was MP3 sharing (Opinion, 2000: 3). 
The legitimacy of such classifications is better understood within a broader context of 
individual authorship (Giesler, 2008). Legitimation tactics included reference to ‘depriving 
the recording industry’s control over their property and compensation’ to ‘harming musicians, 
producers, unions and other legitimate sellers of music, both traditional and [on] the Internet’ 
(Brief of Plaintiffs, 2000: 5). 
 
What we see here is a Market Conservative discourse connected to possessive individualism, 
endorsing the privatisation of music as something that belongs to authors and merchants of 
music, and who are deserving of remuneration. Those who were permitted to speak about the 
economic damage caused by alternative distribution visions and able to underline the 
illegitimacy of free MP3s included Charles Robbins, a small shop owner catering to Syracuse 
University students, Mike Stoller, a composer and songwriter, Michael Dreese, co-owner of a 
music store chain, and representatives from the US Copyright Office. Stoller (2000: 2) 
complained how ‘each time anonymous users of Napster swap a song [he has] composed, he 
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is deprived of the royalty…that work should have earned’, blaming Napster for ‘jeopardizing 
the future for music if it gets away with its thievery’. 
 
MP3s traded through Napster were subsequently classified as ‘pirated copies’ and file sharing 
categorised as an illegitimate practice (Opinion, 2000). Sharing threatened the standing of 
existing practices of music consumption and was literally a condition of possibility for the 
emergence of a non-capitalist distribution regime. It violated the opportunity for capitalist 
market structures to replicate themselves into the future, jeopardising revenue streams and 
corporate financial accumulation. This is not something that agencies capable of using hyper-
power would permit to pass without considerable challenge. And in the Plaintiff’s brief 
(2000: 14-15) it was argued:   
 
‘The district court found that the defendant has contributed to a new attitude that 
digitally-downloaded songs ought to be free – an attitude that creates formidable 
hurdles for the establishment of a commercial downloading market. The evidence 
shows that perhaps the greatest danger posed by Napster…is that consumers are 
beginning to consider free music to be an entitlement.’  
 
Other court documents echoed these views. Hyper-power is being performed: ‘Once 
consumers become accustomed to obtaining something [for] free, they resist paying for it…if 
the perception of music as a free good becomes pervasive it may be difficult to reverse’ 
(Transcript of Proceedings, 2000: 52). Law courts, in other words, provide the scaffolding for 
judgments of value in the market system. Value is not – as Vargo and Lusch (2015) and 
Chandler and Vargo (2011) assert – only a function of co-production between service 
provider, customer or the amorphous mass of a service ecosystem (cf. Giesler et al., 2012).  
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This is not to suggest attributions of value are simple and straightforward. Given the 
disruptive nature of MP3 and P2P, it was not easy to enrol these objects and practices within 
the circuits of legal judgment and capital accumulation. This is apparent in Judge Marilyn 
Hall Patel’s final ruling: ‘the court finds that although downloading and uploading MP3s is 
not a paradigmatic commercial activity, it is not also typical of…personal use in the 
traditional sense. It may be what makes this case difficult…is that it is hard sometimes to 
make [a] neat fit’ (Transcript of Proceedings, 2000: 73). Mutations took place in terms of 
rights of ownership or fair use associated with legitimate music consumption practices. 
Whereas existing music consumption practices included copying, sharing, modifying, 
bequeathing and re-selling of music, these rules metamorphosed to deny them with respect to 
digital music consumption. Judges asserted that unlike copying music for friends, the ‘vast 
scale of Napster’ use is anonymous’. As such, the ‘court finds that downloading and 
uploading MP3 music files with the assistance of Napster are not private uses’ since users 
were getting ‘something for free that they would ordinarily have to buy’ (Opinion, 2001: 5).  
 
Sharing thus mutated into ‘distribution’ and ‘reproduction’; from sharing with friends to 
provisioning other people unknown to the user. This modified the framing of the activity 
from private consumption to public distribution. The Court of Appeals thereby defined the 
activities of Napster’s users as breaching the copyright holder’s rights of ‘reproduction when 
they upload a file’ and reproduction rights ‘when they download files’ (Opinion, 2001: 25). 
This transmutation is of considerable importance. This is highlighted when we refer back to 
the classical liberal legal discourse that justified private property. Consumption, as a 
transformative activity (i.e. in copying, sharing, gifting and reselling), is no longer a bundle 
of activities acknowledged as involving legitimate labour or expression which co-create 
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value. This differentiates MP3s from other music formats, where consumers can freely gift 
and re-sell their music. Relative to digital consumption, there have also been mutations in the 
positions that could be occupied by consumers relative to copyright owners. Previously, the 
former were referenced as rightful owners able to manage, sell, gift, bequeath or abandon 
their product. With MP3s, these rules are only applicable to creators and copyright owners. 
Consumer agency is restricted and deviations from acceptable practice would lead to their 
actions being equated with thievery or piracy.   
 
The ease with which a Market Conservative discourse was mobilised is testament to the 
hyper-power derived from legally sanctioned legitimacy. With the normalisation of a 
discourse that made file sharing a deviant act, the legislative apparatus enabled the 
transformation of the ‘pirate’ into a paying customer. Strategies to re-format the subjectivity 
of music users into paying customers wove a tight web of control to measure, monitor and 
expose file-sharers. Notable in this regard is the enforcement of new legislation accompanied 
by fines, threats of incarceration, educational campaigns and legal services offering music 
that feels free. These tactics work at varying levels from punitive mechanisms through to 
modifying the moral fibre of the individual (see Denegri-Knott, 2004, Giesler, 2008). The 
objective is to encourage repentance and restrict consumption. Consumers are given the 
‘choice’ of supporting online retailers like the new legal Napster or corporate behemoths like 
iTunes and Walmart. It is not a coincidence that there have been numerous efforts to ‘educate’ 
file-sharers and the wider public. In a diverse range of official documents (IFPI, 2015), PR 
campaigns (e.g. ‘Who Really Cares about Illegal Downloading’, 2002-2006) and websites 
targeting school children, the moral rights of music creators and others servicing the 
recording industry to be financially rewarded for their efforts are accentuated as legitimation 
for delimiting a previously largely unregulated activity (cf. Edvardsson et al., 2014).  
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Discussion  
This paper makes a number of contributions. We demonstrated how complex, power-infused 
processes leading to the production of discourses animating the legitimation of consumer 
choice options and associated consumption practices could be brought to the fore. This was 
achieved by accounting for the conditions of possibility and acceptability for MP3. We 
subsequently examined the interweaved discursive struggles through which legitimate 
practices – ways of understanding goods and ways of accessing, using, modifying, 
exchanging and divesting them – are established in a court of law. These were linked to a 
variety of social discourses that constituted the bases for the conditions of acceptability for 
the formation and dissemination of new discursive inflections.  
 
We showed how institutional agents – including the recording industry – who sought to 
classify MP3s as a consumer choice option were legislatively attributed with more weight 
than competing discourses. Commentaries proffered by legal scholars and informed observers 
aligned to Digital Communitarianism which had the potential to disrupt the efficiency of the 
market were denied any credibility in the ‘games of truth’ operative around MP3 (Foucault, 
1984).  
 
Our legal focus was a departure from existing work within mainstream marketing research 
(e.g. Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Vargo and Akaka, 2012; Vargo and Lusch, 2015). In this 
case, we engaged with the legal community and stressed their role in constituting value in 
market systems. Not all collectively enacted practices, even those that are experienced as 
beneficial by consumers, such as P2P file sharing (cf. Giesler, 2006), acquire sufficient 
legitimacy to enter value co-creation interactions. Once practices are positioned within the 
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terrain of illegality, as we have shown here, they are denied any legal status as elements in 
value co-creation. 
 
Our contrast with Consumer Culture Theoretics is equally marked (e.g. Arsel and Bean, 
2013; Holt, 1998; Schau et al., 2009). Practices documented by Schau et al. (2009) like 
looking after cars or attending concerts are already defined as legitimate. In this paper, we did 
not want a priori to accept the status of extant consumption practices as legitimate. Our 
Foucauldian intent was to expose the discursive and legal processes that were the conditions 
of possibility and conditions of acceptability for a consumption practice. While there are CCT 
related studies that explore the interplay between the regulatory environment and marketing 
practice, their attention was devoted to general processes of legitimation (e.g. Brei and 
Tadajewski, 2015; Humphreys, 2010a). They did not focus on how the legal community 
performed a major role in de-legitimating an alternative frame for conceptualising 
consumption practice (cf. Giesler, 2008; Humphreys, 2010a). This makes our paper a novel 
contribution to the literature, developing both S-D Logic and CCT research in a socio-legal 
direction that has not featured significantly in previous studies.   
 
We should wind up this analysis by recalling Foucault’s (2015) injunctions about the 
relationships between capitalism, the legal system, market system(s) and power effects. In the 
case of MP3, they have been analytically positioned within the circuits of the legal system. 
This institutional arrangement engages in ‘ceaseless reciprocity’ with the market system 
(Foucault, 2008: 164). On the basis of our genealogy, we can say that our socio-legal system, 
capitalistic exchange relations and the subject positions available to consumers are influenced 
by a conjunction of prominent actors who are shaped by and help shape the legal system 
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(Foucault, 2008, 2015). The processes involved are complex and need to be studied on a case 
by case basis. 
 
What we do not wish to imply is that we have documented an instance of repressive power 
whereby people have unwittingly been forced to participate in the exchange relationships 
being articulated. This distinguishes our research from the extant literature that has a 
tendency to outline repressive views of power relations in this industry and product context 
(e.g. Giesler, 2008: 745, 749). Buying MP3s and using them in the manner legitimated by our 
legal system and the framing provided by Market Conservatism does provide a different point 
of engagement with MP3 for some people. Obviously, a considerable proportion of 
individuals continue to use MP3s and download them illegally (Denegri-Knott, 2004, Giesler, 
2008). For many, though, the prism of Market Conservativism is the only way their exchange 
relationship has ever been framed. It is a norm and these exert power effects in the 
marketplace (Geiger et al., 2012). Among others, they delimit decision-making (Ahrne et al., 
2015). But we cannot deny the pleasure and value that many people gain from their 
participation with online marketplaces that retail MP3s and facilitate easy and secure access 
to the vast musical resources this world can provide (Giesler, 2008).  
 
This is why ‘hyper-power’ can be insidious (Foucault, 2015): it discounts other options, other 
ways of framing the world (Foucault, 2008), whilst being extremely pleasurable (Foucault, 
1979). This discounting effect takes place – in the main – before the consumer registers the 
funnelling process that channels their consumption options. Furthermore, the incorporation of 
MP3 within the circuits of copyright law and capital flows was never framed in repressive 
terms. Denials of access via certain distribution routes were met with counterpoint arguments 
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that stressed consumer benefit for the foreseeable future. This is not a power that simply 
represses. It ‘produces things, it produces pleasure’ (Foucault, 1979: 137).                         
 
The above point is not intended to be a functionalist argument in support of the status-quo. 
We cannot easily know the extent to which the functional qualities of the system outweigh 
the dysfunctions. This requires comparative analysis with alternative consumption regimes 
and user communities. It will invariably be context- and perspective dependent (Ahrne et al., 
2015; Geiger et al., 2012). And explicating these ideas, as scholars tend to say, requires 
further research. But we might speculate that what we see in the legitimation of MP3 and 
downloading is a variant of a ‘narcotizing dysfunction’ (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1948/2002). 
In its original version this centred on the fact that we can have considerable amounts of 
information about the political system, but end up being apathetic. In our case, legitimation 
and legality might be providing pleasure at the same time as they ‘narcotize’, foreclosing 
alternative consumption regimes and delimiting the way we conceptualise the market and our 
place within it.        
 
Conclusion  
In this paper we have provided an account of the formation, legitimation tactics and legal 
sanction for MP3s as a consumer choice option. Scholarship within the domain of S-D Logic 
has championed the idea that value is manifested in the collective enactment of practices 
among a range of actors (Akaka and Vargo, 2015). Our work shows that this needs to be 
qualified. Not all collectively enacted practices such as peer-to-peer sharing will acquire 
sufficient legitimacy to permit them to enter co-creative interactions. Their value is 
effectively denied sanction before it enters the marketing system (cf. Grönroos, 2012). Only 
certain practices are rendered legitimate methods for facilitating the co-creation of value and 
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here the role of the legal system is paramount. Reflecting these points, our genealogy 
addressed the need for work to further our understanding of how consumption patterns 
emerge and are structured at the macro (political-economic-legal), meso (corporate) and 
micro (individual articulations before they cohere) level of practices (Brei and Tadajewski, 
2015; Edvardsson et al., 2014; Giesler, 2008; Humphreys, 2010a; Prior, forthcoming).    
 
We have made a number of contributions. Our study provides insight into the production of 
knowledge and the constitution of the boundaries of discursive formation regarding how 
goods are to be accessed, used, transformed, exchanged and divested. This level of 
structuring effectively frames ‘correct’ consumption. We focused on the power inflected 
processes and historical contingencies leading to the structuring of the field of action that 
constituted the consumption domain of MP3 as legitimate consumer choice options. We have 
shown how the structuring of consumption patterns are enacted in courts of law that have 
effects, not simply over taste, but on how goods are accessed, used, transformed and 
exchanged. These practices cut to the core of marketing theory (Akaka and Vargo, 2015; 
Chandler and Vargo, 2011; Vargo and Akaka, 2012), the way we understand processes of 
value constitution (Giesler et al., 2012), our conceptualisation of consumption as a ‘choice’  
(Atik and Fırat, 2013) and the consumer as sovereign (Geiger et al., 2012). 
 
In this case, consumption choices are channelled and sovereignty is seriously restricted. This 
is an argument that has received very little attention to date, but which promises to make 
further inroads into our conceptual architecture. The centrality of practices as mechanisms for 
value creation accorded by both managerially orientated CCT literature and S-D Logic should 
invite, not preclude, a more politically or power sensitive intervention. We hope that our 
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paper has provided a stimulus to forward an understanding of politically embedded value co-
creation.  
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